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Public School Finance Reform and the Role
of Local Control of the Schools
Anne-Marie Eileraast
Large funding disparities among the public school districts of
many states have sparked intense criticism of local property taxes
as the primary basis for school funding.' In the last two years, the
supreme courts of several states have struck down school finance
systems on the basis of such disparities in per pupil funding.2
These decisions, by identifying education as a state duty,' also may
signal greater state involvement in the traditionally locally-managed school districts.
Because of state supreme court decisions invalidating their
public school funding schemes, many state legislatures have become involved in the debate over how best to achieve educational
equity in a system funded largely by local tax revenues.' So far, the
states have retained locally-based funding." However, particular
legislative reforms have reflected a difference in the value which
the states place on local financial and substantive control of the
schools." With similar school funding challenges pending in at least
thirteen states,7 many other states soon may have to balance the
t B.A. 1986, Yale University; J.D. Candidate 1992, University of Chicago.
See, generally, Julie Underwood and Deborah Verstegen, eds, The Impacts of Litigation and Legislation on Public School Finance (Harper & Row, 1990).
' See William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and
Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J L & Educ
219 (1990), discussing some of the recent decisions and legislative responses.
8 See, for example, Rose v Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 SW2d 186, 207 (Ky 1989).
' The median local share of school expenditures is 50 percent. The highest local share,
in New Hampshire, is over 90 percent of total funds. See Norman C. Thomas, Equalizing
Educational Opportunity Through School Finance Reform: A Review Assessment, 48 U
Cin L Rev 255, 256 (1979).
Hawaii, whose schools are fully state funded, is the only exception. Id at 255.
Compare New Jersey's Quality Education Act of 1990, 1990 NJ Sess Law Serv 52,
§§ 6 and 23, which restrict local budget increases, with the Kentucky Education Reform Act
of 1990, 1990 Ky Acts 476 § 7, which sharply increases funding to poorer districts, but preserves the ability of local districts to supplement their budgets with local funds.
See Casey Banas, N.J. School FinancingLatest To Fail Court Test, Chicago Tribune
1-1 (June 6, 1990) (listing funding suits as pending in Kansas, Wisconsin, California, Connecticut, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming, and Arkansas as well as in Illinois). Similar
disputes are brewing in other states. See Amy Goldstein, Md. Coalition Seeks Equality in
Education, Washington Post D4 (Sept 23, 1990); Experts Say Ohio's School Financing
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sometimes competing values of absolute financial equality and local initiative as they respond to court orders to restructure school
finance.
I.

THE SHIFT TOWARD GREATER STATE INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC
SCHOOL FINANCE

Lawsuits seeking to redress school funding disparities are not
new.' However, since early 1989, state supreme courts have asserted a new, state law ground for invalidating public school finance schemes: the state constitutions' education clauses.' The result is that several state legislatures, in pursuit of equal funding,
are taking a greater role in school finance. Although different
states have adopted different reform strategies, all provide for
some shift in fiscal control from localities to the states.
A.

The Movement Toward Public School Finance Reform: Redefining the States' Duty to Educate

Most states fund their public schools with a combination of
state and local property tax revenues.10 In many of those states,
property taxes account for the majority of overall funds spent on
education.11 This dual (state and local) funding system is based in
part on the rationale that demand for education works like demand for goods and services in the marketplace: people will choose

Method is Unfair, UPI Ohio Regional News (Nov 1, 1990); Richard Lovegrove, Educators
score funding disparity proposal, UPI Va Regional News (Nov 12, 1990); and Donald
Yacoe, Tennessee Court Begins Trial of Lawsuit That Contests State's Educational Funding, Bond Buyer 2 (Oct 30, 1990). In addition, the California Supreme Court has agreed to
review a controversial lower court ruling that the state must take financial responsibility for

a bankrupt school district. Resolution of the issue, according to Governor Pete Wilson's
brief to the state supreme court 'will set the course for public school financing for years.'"
Philip Hager, Justices Deny Stay but Will Rule on Richmond School Loan, LA Times A27
(May 9, 1991) (quoting brief by Governor Pete Wilson).
6 For a description of previous funding challenges, see Betsy Levin, Current Trends in
School Finance Reform Litigation: A Commentary, 1977 Duke L J 1099, 1101-02 n 11.
'

The constitution of every state, with the exception of Mississippi, has a provision

establishing public schools. See Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 Va L Rev 1639, 1661

(1989).
10 Hawaii is the only exception. See Thomas, 48 U Cin L Rev at 255 (cited in note 4).
"

For instance,' in Illinois local taxes account for 62 percent of total education expendi-

tures. Laura Jones, Suburb schools seek unity on funding suit, Chicago Tribune 1-23 (Dec
13, 1990).
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to pay, through their local property taxes, the price of what educa12
tion is worth to them.
Of course, in districts where the property tax base is low and
school tax rates are high, municipalities may be unable to raise
enough revenues to accommodate demand for education. 3 As a result, the amount of money spent on an individual child's education
depends to a large extent on the property wealth of the district in
which that child resides."' The resulting funding disparity among
school districts 5 has sparked numerous attempts to reform school
finance.
At first, plaintiffs seeking to reform public school finance
based their challenges on the equal protection guarantees in the
U.S. Constitution 6 and in some state constitutions. 17 Many litigants used the United States Supreme Court's language in Brown v
Board of Educ.'s that "education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments. .... Such an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must
be made available to all on equal terms."' 9 Based on the Brown
dictum, reformers argued that education is a fundamental right
and that school finance systems are thus subject to strict judicial

scrutiny.2
' See Therese A. McCarty and Harvey E. Brazer, On Equalizing School Expenditures,
9 Econ of Educ Rev 251, 252 (1990).
An additional factor urged in support of the property tax system is that local funding
maximizes local control. See the Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio School Dist. v
Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 53 n 109 (1973).
13 This so called "municipal overburden" occurs in poorer urban districts that have a
high level of governmental need and relatively low property values. See the New Jersey
Supreme Court's opinion in Abbott by Abbott v Burke, 119 NJ 287, 575 A2d 359, 393 (1990).
" See Thomas, 48 U Cin L Rev at 265-66.
" In some states, poor students receive only one-fifth the funds available to pupils in
wealthier districts. In Illinois, for example, per pupil spending for the 1990-91 school year
ranged from $12,866 to $2,095. Casey Banas, NJ School FinancingLatest To Fail Court
Test, Chicago Tribune 1-1 (June 6, 1990).
10 US Const, Amend XIV, § 1, provides that "No state shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
17 For a discussion of the history of public school finance litigation, see Annotation,
Validity of Basing Public School Financing System on Local Property Taxes, 41 ALR3d
1220 (1990); John Silard and Sharon White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education:
The Case for Judicial Relief under the Equal Protection Clause, 1970 Wis L Rev 7, 11-20;
Levin, 1977 Duke L J 1099 (cited in note 8).
Is 347 US 483 (1954).
Is Id at 493.
"OSee Serrano v Priest, 18 Cal 3d 728, 557 P2d 929 (1976) ("SerranoII"); Serrano v
Priest, 5 Cal 3d 584, 487 P2d 1241 (1971) ("Serrano I") (holding that state school funding
system violated the federal and California equal protection clauses). See also Stuart Biegel,
Reassessing the Applicability of FundamentalRights Analysis: The Fourteenth Amend-
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However, in San Antonio School Dist. v Rodriguez,2 the Supreme Court held that education is not a fundamental federal right
and effectively foreclosed arguments that the federal equal protection clause mandates equal school funding. At issue in Rodriguez
was a state school finance system that relied to a large extent on
local property taxes and therefore allowed significant disparities in
per pupil funding among districts.22 Holding that the Texas system
was not subject to strict judicial scrutiny, the majority recognized
that some trade-off between equal funding and local control may
result:
[I]t is no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation for school revenues provides less freedom of choice
with respect to expenditures for some districts than for
others. .

.

. It is also well to remember that even those

districts that have reduced ability to make free decisions
with respect to how much they spend on education still
retain . . . authority as to how available funds will be allocated. . . . [O]ther systems of school financing, which

place more of the financial responsibility in the hands of
the State, [may] result
in a comparable lessening of de23
sired local autonomy.

Although it reveals the majority's concerns, the Court's dictum
about local control does not limit a state's ability to establish any
public school financing system of its choosing, including one that
may abridge local control. Rodriguez grants full control of school
24
funding to the states.
After Rodriguez, litigants turned to state constitutional provisions in order to argue that inequality of school funding is impermissible. 25 These state clauses all provide for some statewide system of public schools. However, the wording of the clauses differs
in terms of the clarity and strength of the states' commitment to
ment and the Shaping of Educational Policy After Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools,
74 Cornell L Rev 1078, 1079 (1989).
411 US 1, 18 (1973).
Id at 19.
" Id at 50-52.
, See Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 Wis L Rev 83, 110, noting that
"school districts are mere subdivisions of the states" and that the Rodriguez Court's "deference to local autonomy [is not] elevated to the level of a formal holding."
'5 For a discussion of the role of state constitutions in education finance reform, see
Thro, 19 J L & Educ 219 (cited in note 2), and Note, 75 Va L Rev 1639 (cited in note 9).
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education. 8 Several commentators have noted that the provisions
fall into four general categories: 27 Category I contains the least explicit commitment to education;2 8 Category II requires a "thorough," "efficient," and/or "uniform" school system;2 9 and Categories III and IV express a clear commitment to education as one of
the paramount duties of the state."0 Based on these wording differences, some commentators have predicted that those states whose
education clauses fall into the stronger categories would be the
first to reform public school finance. 31
Within the past two years, several state supreme courts, including Kentucky, 32 Montana," New Jersey,-4 and Texas,3

5

have

invalidated public school funding systems as violating their state
constitutional education clauses.3 6 It is significant that these four
state supreme courts interpreted their respective states' Category
II constitutions as mandating greater equality in school funding
because Category II provisions contain the second-weakest expression of state commitment to education. Therefore, one could expect any of the 35 states in Categories II, III, and IV to be susceptible to similar attacks. 7
Furthermore, although the Category II states' education provisions are worded similarly, each of these states has adopted a different strategy to restructure its schools in accordance with its constitutional standard.3 8 At the very least, the divergence in
, See Erica Black Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right to Bilingual Education, 9 Harv CR-CL L Rev 52, 66-71 (1974).
'7 See id; Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective
Education in Basic Skills, 63 Tex L Rev 777, 815 (1985); Thro, 19 J L & Educ at 243 n 130.
" For example, the New York provision states that "[t]he legislature shall provide for
the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools. . . ." NY Const, Art XI,
§ 1. Fourteen other provisions are included in Category 1. See Thro, 19 J L & Educ at 243.
" New Jersey's provision, calling for "the maintenance and support of a thorough and
efficient system of free public schools" is typical. NJ Const, Art VIII, § 4, 1.
"OSee Grubb, 9 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 68-69. For example, California's guarantee that
"the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement" falls into Category III. Cal Const, Art IX, § 1.
a' See Thro, 19 J L & Educ at 245-47 (cited in note 2).
82 Rose v Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 SW2d 186 (Ky 1989).
33 Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1 v Montana, 769 P2d 684 (Mont 1989).
" Abbott, 119 NJ 287, 575 A2d 359.
35 Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v Kirby, 777 SW2d 391 (Tex 1989).
: Ky Const, § 183; Mont Const, Art X, § 1; NJ Const, Art VIII, § 4; Tex Const, Art
VII, § 1.
: See Thro, 19 J L & Educ at 249-50 (cited in note 2).
Compare New Jersey's Quality Education Act of 1990, 1990 NJ Sess Law Serv 52,
with Kentucky's Education Reform Act of 1990, 1990 Ky Acts 476, discussed below.
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strategies suggests that the state constitutional text itself does not
determine that state's approach to finance reform.
The recent reform litigation's focus on the intent and meaning
of state education clauses does not implicate federal constitutional
law. 9 Nevertheless, because the education clauses of most state
constitutions contain wording similar to or stronger than that used
recently to invalidate school systems, the states' role in public
school reform has become an issue of nationwide significance. In
addition, the trend of many state supreme courts to take an increasingly activist approach toward state constitutional jurisprudence4" may sustain a wave of similar decisions in other states.
B.

Greater State Involvement in School Finance: The Examples
of Kentucky and New Jersey

The recent state court decisions, along with the legislation to
implement them, could potentially radically restructure the public
schools in their respective states. The legislative reforms sparked
by two of these decisions-Rose v Council for Better Educ., Inc.41
in Kentucky and Abbott by Abbott v Burke 42 in New
Jersey-exemplify two alternative strategies for reworking state
public schools. Kentucky's legislation has retained a "minimum
level" approach to funding that, while it allows districts to supplement state funds with local property taxes, dramatically boosts
state funding and completely redesigns school governance. "3 In
contrast to the Kentucky plan, New Jersey's Quality Education
Act of 199044 is more explicitly equality-oriented, limiting the
amount by which local districts may increase their budgets based
on local taxes. 45 These two approaches serve as alternative models
for other states seeking to restructure their public schools.

Although state constitutions may give courts the freedom to protect individual rights

not guaranteed in the federal constitution, state constitutional law has its own unique difficulties. For instance, the frequency of amendments and the states' practice of borrowing
from earlier state constitutions may make the intent of a particular provision difficult to
discern. See Thro, 19 J L & Educ at 226-27 n 35.
40 See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 Harv L Rev 489 (1977), arguing that, given the conservative majority on the U.S.
Supreme Court, state high courts have become increasingly active in the protection of individual liberty. See also Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism:Both Liberal and Conserva-

tive, 63 Tex L Rev 1081, 1088 (1985).
" 790 SW2d 186 (Ky 1989).
4- 119 NJ 287, 575 A2d 359 (1990).

40 See Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990, 1990 Ky Acts 476.
"' 1990 NJ Sess Law Serv 52.
48 Id at § 85.
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Council for Better Educ., Inc. found that the "virtual
hodgepodge of educational opportunities" offered Kentucky
schoolchildren justified invalidating the entire school system as unconstitutional.4 6 The court interpreted the constitution's education
7
clause, "[providing] for an efficient system of common schools,"4
to require that "each and every child in th[e] state should receive a
proper and adequate education." 8 The court considered both intrastate inequality and the inadequacy of Kentucky schools with
respect to national standards relevant to its holding. Although the
court found all districts' funding inadequate, the decision specifically criticized reliance on "permissive" local taxes as a source of
49
discrimination against 80 percent of the state's pupils.
The Council for Better Educ., Inc. court also emphasized that
education is a state duty-"a constitutional mandate placed by the
people" on the General Assembly.50 The court called for "strong,
centralized control (by the state)" of the public schools and "restated the overall goals of the system as 'uniformity and equality'
for the school children of the state 'as a whole.' What could be
clearer? ' 51 Although the court left the specific design of the new
school system to the legislature, the opinion cited a West Virginia
case 52 for the proposition that "[c]ourts may, should and have involved themselves in defining the standards of a constitutionally
'53
mandated educational system.
In such a system, the legislature has the duty to provide each
and every child in the state "with an equal opportunity to have an
adequate education" and to monitor the system "on a continuing
basis . . . so that there is no waste, no duplication, no mismanagement, at any level."' 54 That obligation "cannot be shifted to local
' 55
counties and local school districts.
Despite the strong language about equality and fundamental
rights, the Council for Better Educ., Inc. court nevertheless ac-

40

'
48

Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 SW2d at 198.
Ky Const, § 183.
Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 SW2d at 189.

"1Id at 198-99.
50 Id at 211.
11 Id at 207, quoting Commonwealth ex rel Baxter v Burnett, 237 Ky 473, 35 SW2d
857, 859 (1931).
5' Pauley v Kelly, 162 W Va 672, 255 SE2d 859 (1979), used the state constitution's
education clause to hold that education is a fundamental right in West Virginia and that the
existing school finance system was inadequate.
63 Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 SW2d at 210.
Id at 211.
86 Id.
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knowledged the General Assembly's power to create a partially localized funding system:
[I]f the General Assembly decides to establish local
school entities, it may also empower them to enact local
revenue initiatives to supplement the uniform, equal educational effort that the General Assembly must provide.
. . . This includes .

.

. the power to assess local ad

valorem taxes on real property and personal property.
• . . Such local efforts may not be used

. .

as a substi-

tute for providing an adequate, equal and substantially
uniform educational system ....
Although the court recognized the potential conflict between "supplementary" local funding and equality by warning that local funding could not substitute for the state's constitutional obligation,
the court explicitly stated that "a supplementary effort in no way
reduces or negates the minimum quality of education required"
statewide.57 In other words, a minimum funding level (albeit a high
one), rather than an equal level, will suffice to meet Kentucky's
constitutional mandate.
The Kentucky legislature followed Council for Better Educ.,
Inc. with the Education Reform Act of 1990 ("the Kentucky
Act"), 58 which both substantially increases state funding and completely overhauls the structure of the state school system. 9 The
new system's structure redirects significant decisionmaking authority away from the state and local school boards to individual
schools, but holds those schools much more accountable to the
state for performance.
The Kentucky Act, consistent with the goals presented in
Council for Better Educ., Inc., outlines seven "capacities" that
public school students are to acquire and directs the new State
Board for Elementary and Secondary Education to present a
model curriculum framework which school districts may consult as
they develop their own curriculum. 0 In addition, the Education
Reform Act delegates much of the day-to-day management of the
schools to state-mandated school councils composed of two par6 Id at 212.
6?

Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 SW2d at 212.

"

1990 Ky Acts 476.

For an overview of the major provisions, see Donna Harrington-Lueker, Kentucky
Starts From Scratch, 177 Am School Bd J 17 (Sept 1990).
60 1990 Ky Acts 476, §§ 2-3.
"
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ents, three teachers, and the principal.6 1 However, the Kentucky
Act implements a strict performance assessment system for
schools, including a state "takeover" provision for schools which
fail to comply with their improvement plan.6 2 Schools have more
latitude to make decisions, but if those decisions fail, a state-appointed board will run the errant school and give students the opportunity to go elsewhere.
The Kentucky Act calls for an increase in state funding by
$1.3 billion from state sales and corporate tax hikes as well as from
elimination of a state income tax deduction for federal taxes.6 3 In
keeping with Council for Better Educ., Inc., the Act continues to
64
allow supplementary funding through local taxes.
Although the Kentucky legislation does not mandate equal per
pupil funding, the massive increase in state funding will decrease
local revenues as a percentage of total, school expenditures. As a
result, the new funding scheme effectively dilutes the impact of local funding. Therefore, while Kentucky's approach to finance reform is a "minimum level" approach, the scope of the new appropriation provides students a substantially equal education without
forcing some districts to cut back their budgets.6 5
Since the Kentucky Act does not restrict local districts' ability
to raise taxes, future funding inequalities are still possible. However, if the minimum funding level is high enough, the inequalities
may not be sufficient to compromise the substantive quality of education. Further, the large local tax increases necessary to fuel any
substantial inequality may not be possible politically, especially
given the increase in state taxes.

01

Id at § 14(2)(a).

§ 10(4):
Failure by an educationally deficient school district to meet the process goals, interim performance goals, or timelines set in the district improvement plan shall
constitute grounds for removal of the superintendent and local board members
from office.. . . The State Board for Elementary and Secondary. Education shall
appoint the members of the district's board of education. . . . The appointed
members shall serve a four (4) year term or until the district qualifies for an
elected board ....

6, Id at

"8Harrington-Lueker, 177 Am School Bd J at 20.
" See 1990 Ky Acts 476, § 107.

Id at § 93 provides in part: "It is the intention of the General Assembly to assure
substantially equal public school educational opportunities for those in attendance in the
public schools of the Commonwealth, but not to limit nor to prevent any school district
from providing educational services and facilities beyond those assured -by the state supported program."
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In contrast to Kentucky's minimum level funding approach,
New Jersey's Abbott by Abbott v Burke6 decision has led to more
dramatic egalitarian reforms. The New Jersey Supreme Court
found that the education provided in 28 of the state's poor urban
school districts violated the state constitution. 7 Perhaps because
of the decision's limited scope, the court's holding was much more
explicit in its call for educational equality. The Abbott court's reinterpretation of the state constitution's education provision's to require that "poorer disadvantaged students must be given a chance
to be able to compete with relatively advantaged students" 9 established the groundwork for the court's theory of equal education.
Abbott explicitly encourages the legislature to take a redistributive
approach to school funding:
We find that in order to provide a thorough and efficient
education in these poorer urban districts, the State must
assure that their educational expenditures per pupil are
substantially equivalent to those of the more affluent
suburban districts, and that, in addition, their special
disadvantages must be addressed.70
Under the court's rationale, equality of results may depend on unequal funding-poorer districts may need more money per pupil to
address the special needs of their disadvantaged students.
The Abbott decision signals New Jersey's decreasing reliance
on local property taxes for school funding. Interestingly, the Abbott court mentioned that retaining some local financing is justified by the legislature's finding that local funding encourages local
involvement in the public schools; 71 however, the opinion did not
discuss at any length the relative importance of local involvement.
Abbott did sharply criticize local self-monitoring as one of the
66

119 NJ 287, 575 A2d 359 (1990).

17

Id at 408.

88

NJ Const, Art VIII, § 4, 11 ("The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and

support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the

children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years."). Previously, the New
Jersey court's definition of the constitutionally mandated system of education "was based
on the proposition that the Constitution required a certain level of education, that which

equates with thorough and efficient; it is the level that all must attain; that is the only
equality required by the Constitution." Abbott, 575 A2d at 368, referring to the decision in

Robinson v Cahill, 62 NJ 473, 519, 303 A2d 273 (1973). Under this earlier definition, the
inevitable funding disparities were not in themselves sufficient to render the funding system
unconstitutional. Abbott, 575 A2d at 370-71.
Abbott, 575 A2d at 372.
," Id at 408.
11 Id at 372.
6"
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problems with the old school system. Under the old system, local
monitoring "operated largely as a self-improvement system. Beyond a few state-mandated courses, the local board could approve
72
any curriculum it chose or, presumably, could afford.
New Jersey's Quality Education Act of 1990 ("the New Jersey
Act")," drafted in response to Abbott, extends much farther than
the court-ordered overhaul of the poor urban school districts. The
New Jersey Act provides that "by the 1995-1996 school year, the
per pupil expenditures in the poorer urban districts will be substantially equal to those in the wealthy suburban districts."7 To
achieve this "substantial equality," the New Jersey Act provides
for stricter state board monitoring of local school budgets" and a
more restrictive cap on local districts' ability to raise their spending through increased local levies.76 In addition, the plan calls for
$1.3 billion in increased state personal income taxes"7 as well as
local property tax increases in 150 designated "wealthy" districts
to compensate for cuts in state funding of teacher pensions in
those districts.7 8 As a result, New Jersey's reform legislation is
more likely to achieve substantial equality among school districts
than Kentucky's minimum level funding program.
Although Kentucky and New Jersey illustrate two different
approaches to school finance reform, they both demonstrate a
characteristic common to nearly all reform proposals: an increase
in overall education expenditures. Every state wishing to redress
funding inequalities is likely to do the same.7 9 Without a tax increase, a requirement of equal funding would mandate an equally
7 Id at 392.
7' Quality Education Act of 1990, 1990 NJ Sess Law Serv 52.
74 Id at § 2(5).
70 Id at § 84.
76 Id at § 85.
77 See Daily Rep for Executives (BNA) No 8 (Jan 11, 1991), which also reports a legislative proposal to cap annual budget increases at 13.5 percent for poor districts and 8.5
percent for other districts. These spending caps would allow increased school aid to reduce
local property taxes rather than to increase overall education spending.
See also, David Sacks, Is Florio's Plan Stiff Medicine or Poison? It Will Murder the
Middle Class, NY Times A19 (July 11, 1990); Patricia Van Tassel, Schools Preparingfor
Changes in Financing,NY Times 12NJ1 (Sept 2, 1990); and Patrick Reardon, School suit
could lead to tax hike, Chicago Tribune 3-1 (Nov 15, 1990).
76 See Teachers Union Urges State to Resume Funding of Pensions, 18 Pens Rep
(BNA) 1, 16 (Jan 7, 1991).
7' In fact, legislative action following the rulings in all four states (Montana, Texas,
Kentucky, and New Jersey) has resulted in school funding increases ranging from 30 percent
to 50 percent. See Casey Banas, Chicago Joins 46 Districts in Legal Action, Chicago Tribune 2-1 (Nov 13, 1990).
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mediocre education for all and would drive those who could afford
it to seek private schooling.8 0 Given the low popularity of tax increases, however, passing such legislation might prove to be politically impossible.
II.

THE IMPACT OF EQUAL FUNDING LEGISLATION ON LOCAL
CONTROL OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

State equalization of public school finance, regardless of the
strategy used, necessarily involves increased state involvement in
public school funding.8 ' Historically, public schools have received
most of their funding from local property taxes; a state funding
takeover may consequently increase state substantive control over
schools as well. 2 Legislators will at least have a political incentive
to monitor schools because voters will now hold state rather than
local legislators accountable for the large state tax increases.
Should local schools fail to improve, voters can blame the state
government as a result of its increased involvement in funding.
Although the concept of local control has helped to shape public education throughout the United States, there is little state or
federal constitutional basis for the notion. The concept has figured
80

See McCarty & Brazer, 9 Econ of Educ Rev at 254 (cited in note 12) ("[P]eople in
the high-demand district are likely to spend more than the state allowance, either by supplementing the public school experience with lessons in the private sector or by moving into
the private school system.").
81 School reform proposals "in the interest of equalizing educational costs and services
almost necessarily involve reductions in that local freedom of choice." Thomas, 48 U Cin L
Rev at 267 (cited in note 4). This is clearly the result under both the Kentucky and New
Jersey schemes. In New Jersey, close state monitoring is essential to the maintenance of
"substantially equal" funding. See Quality Education Act of 1990, 1990 NJ Sess Law Serv
52, § 84. The Kentucky legislation provides for state oversight of local district budgets as
well. For example, a new provision sets minimum equivalent tax rates, with removal of the
local school board as the penalty for noncompliance. Education Reform Act of 1990, 1990
Ky Acts 476, § 105(12). Both schemes, by vastly increasing state funds as a percentage of
education spending, also increase state influence.
"
See San Antonio School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 49-50 (1973): "[L]ocal control
means ... the freedom to devote more money to the education of one's children. Equally
important ... is the opportunity it offers for participation in the decisionmaking process
that determines how those local tax dollars will be spent." Furthermore, "[t]his theme-that
greater state control over funding will lead to greater state power with respect to local educational programs and policies-is a recurrent one in the literature on financing public education.. .. [I]t certainly cannot be doubted that there is a rational basis for this concern on
the part of parents, educators, and legislators." Id at 53 n 109.
Since a state bureaucracy is less accountable to voters than are locally elected officials,
state controlled funding would make it easier for the state to impose its substantive as well
as fiscal will. See Thomas, 48 U Cin L Rev at 268-69.
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prominently in dictum in several Supreme Court decisions, 3 most
notably Rodriguez,84 in which the majority emphasized the importance of local control. However, since the structure of education is
a state matter, the Court's statements about the primacy of local
control are not binding on state lawmakers."s Because city and local governments "have no set place in the American constitutional
structure, '86 any power that local authorities may have over education must be delegated to them by the state legislature.8 7 The
vaguely worded state constitutional education provisions do not
explicitly protect local control of the public schools.
Though not expressly protected by the law, local control is
nevertheless valued as a positive force in the public schools. Some
state courts have joined the federal courts in espousing the merits
of local control. For instance, the Maryland Supreme Court has
held that an implicit "primary objective" of the, school financing
system is to "establish and maintain a substantial measure of local
control" over the public schools, including determining both the
level of funding and the way those' funds should be spent.88
Furthermore, school reformers often call for decentralization.
of the public schools in order to foster closer interaction between
communities and schools.8 9 Like the Rodriguez majority, commentators argue that local control allows for educational experimentation that might be chilled or suppressed by a large bureaucracy2 °
For a discussion of Supreme Court decisions which have emphasized local control,
see Note, Educationand the Court: The Supreme Court's EducationalIdeology, 40 Vand L
Rev 939, 967 n 161 (1987):
Traditionally, the Court has been hesitant to intervene in educational disputes
because it viewed the educational process as a local matter. The cultural transmission ideology supports this position and its corollary that if values and beliefs are
to be inculcated, the appropriate body to carry out this function is the local school
board.
84 411 US at 49-53.
88 See Williams, 1986 Wis L Rev at 110 (cited in note 24).
88 Id.
81 This has become increasingly evident as more state supreme

courts reaffirm that constitutional education clauses place authority over public schools with the legislature. For
example, the Rose v Council for Better Educ., Inc. court states that "[t]he sole responsibility for providing the system of common schools is that of our General Assembly. .. This
obligation cannot be shifted to local [bodies]." 790 SW2d 186, 211 (Ky 1989).
88 Hornbeck v Somerset Cty. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md 597, 458 A2d 758 (1983).
e,See John Lacks and Shirley Lacks, Education and the Power of the State; Reconceiving Some Problems and Their Solutions, in Neal Devins, ed, Public Values, Private
Schools 235, 237 (Falmer Press, 1989).
" See Jack B. Weinstein, Equality, Liberty; and the Public Schools, 48 U Cin L Rev
203, 230-31 (1979), presenting the argument that a school system is more responsive to community needs when local officials are accountable to the .public for school management
decisions.
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Ironically, even as some states are moving toward greater centralization in school finance, localities are experimenting with more
community involvement. For instance, the Chicago public schools
adopted a decentralized management structure organized around
newly created local school councils dominated by parents."1 In addition, many districts nationwide (Milwaukee is the most obvious
example) have discussed establishing special schools to implement
an Afrocentric curriculum.9 2 All of these measures seem to underscore the importance of local initiative in tailoring the schools to
meet particular community needs.
The extent to which state fiscal dominance will infringe on local control depends in part on which approach a state has chosen
to reform its school finances. Even under Kentucky's minimum
level funding model, districts may be subject to greater state substantive as well as fiscal control. For instance, state monitoring
could lead to a complete state "takeover" of failing districts and
the ouster of the ineffectual school boards.9 s Any reform plan
which extends state fiscal power is likely to expand state substan4
tive influence as well.
In New Jersey's equality-driven system, however, budget
caps-restrictions on how much a district may raise its budget
through local funds in a given year-are a greater structural avenue for state control.9 ' Moreover, the spending restrictions necessitate state monitoring of school budgets as well as substantive performance. Of course, the poor districts under a locally funded

91 See E. Mark Hanson, School-based Management and Educational Reform in the
United States and Spain, 34 Comp Educ Rev 523, 527-29 (1990). See also Fumarolo v Chicago Bd. of Educ., No 69558, 1990 WL 186394 (Ill Nov 30, 1990) (Illinois Supreme Court
found that the method of electing local school council representatives violated the "one person-one vote" principle articulated in Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533 (1964)).
" See Isabel Wilkerson, Blacks Look to Basics, NY Times 4-26 (Nov 4, 1990).
" See Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990, 1990 Ky Acts 476, § 10.
" One commentator argues that even ful-state funding would not restrict local substantive control aside from forcing property-rich districts to "make hard fiscal choices" such
as that "between updating their computer hardware and building a new fieldhouse." The

author speculates that "parents and communities may become more involved in the educational process when they are not assured that their tax dollars will purchase a superior
education." Note, Equal EducationalOpportunity Revisited, 40 Rutgers L Rev 193, 235 n

223 (1987). This assumes (improbably) that parents who want and can afford more education will not simply opt out of the public schools. Once parents opt out, they will be less
likely to support increased public school funding. Further, the argument ignores the effects
of political pressure on the state legislature to monitor how its money is being spent by the
local districts.
" Quality Education Act of 1990, 1990 NJ Sess Law Serv 52, § 85. See also Patrick
Reardon, School Suit Could Lead to Tax Hike, Chicago Tribune 3-1 (Nov 15, 1990).
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system often labor under an effective budgetary ceiling.9 6 With an
eroded tax base, high tax rates, and numerous competing expenses,
poorer districts may be unable to raise enough money to implement educational programs. 7 Nevertheless, an adequately funded
''minimum level" approach could afford poorer districts sufficient
choice while at the same time allowing a greater measure of local
initiative.' 8

III.

CHOOSING A SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM STRATEGY: THE ROLE
OF LOCAL CONTROL

The challenge facing states seeking to reform school finance
lies in creating an equitable funding system which is able to incorporate meaningful local influence in the schools. Since restructuring school funding is really a matter of integrating fiscal and substantive reforms, Kentucky's approach may have the greatest
potential for success." Aside from substantially increasing school
funding, Kentucky's Education Reform Act of 1990100 has completely overhauled the public schools in a way that makes constructive use of local initiative.
In order to assess the proper role of local influence, it is important to recognize those aspects of local control that are problematic. A major premise underlying any defense of local influence in
the schools is that the schools best able to transmit cultural values
are those subject to community control.' 0 ' Sociological research
showing that parochial schools tend to outperform public or secular private schools demonstrates the benefits of shared values to
educational quality. 0 2 However, "local values" are hard to identify.

"

See San Antonio School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 68 (1973) (White, dissenting):

If the State aims at maximizing local initiative and local choice ...

it utterly fails

in achieving its purpose in districts with property tax bases so low that there is
little if any opportunity for interested parents, rich or poor, to augment school

district revenues.
'7 See McCarty & Brazer, 9 Econ of Educ Rev at 254 (cited in note 12).
" See Thomas, 48 U Cin L Rev at 305 (cited in note 4):

Removal of political and budgetary constraints and substantial increases in the
level of state foundation grants sufficient to raise each district to, say, the eightieth or ninetieth percentile level would preserve the existing structure's reliance
on local control of funding and secure a substantial measure of equality.
" After its supreme court ruled the entire public school system unconstitutional, Ken-

tucky "has gone back to the drawing board and rebuilt its entire education system." Harrington-Lueker, 177 Am School Bd J at 17 (citation omitted) (cited in note 59).
100 1990 Ky Acts 476.
101 See Note, 40 Vand L Rev at 969 (cited in note 83).
00

See James S. Coleman and Thomas Hoffer, Public and Private High Schools: The

Impact of Communities (Basic Books, 1987).
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Attempting to teach "local values" in the public schools poses a
danger that, in trying to avoid serving the needs of only part of
their constituency, the schools will not stand for any values at
all. 10 Furthermore, control of the schools may fall to narrow special interest factions elected for political, rather than educational,
reasons.10 4 Under such circumstances, simply decentralizing control
of the schools likely will fail to effect meaningful reforms. 0 5
Despite these pitfalls, Kentucky's legislation seems to be
drafted carefully enough to make use of the strengths of local control. Day-to-day control is centered in the individual schools themselves, through the educator-dominated school councils rather than
in the community at large. This structure decentralizes the school
bureaucracy,' 0 6 but not at the cost of turning over education entirely to the arena of local politics. The Kentucky legislation's
"anti-patronage" provisions both reflect and support the state's
desire to keep school governance as free as possible from political
07
concerns.1
Also, the strict accountability of local schools to the state in
terms of meeting performance standards should help the state
board keep control of the system without involving the state in
daily school management. 0 8 The state effectively monitors the output of the system-student achievement-rather than promulgating detailed regulations governing school management. 0 9 On the
whole, although Kentucky's reform plan emphatically locates ultimate authority in the state, the state's authority is primarily a
monitoring power. Local school councils gain control over the specifics of making the schools work. This solution makes sense as a
balance of state and local control, since a large state bureaucracy
seems less well-suited to daily management than would be a
school-based council.
Achieving a state/local balance in the structure of school finance is somewhat more difficult. Ultimately, the appropriate bal103 See John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, Politics, Markets, and America's Schools
54-55 (Brookings Inst, 1990).
'" See Thomas, 48 U Cin L Rev at 268-71 (cited in note 4).
101 See, generally, Hanson, 34 Comp Educ Rev at 536-37 (cited in note 91).
'" Id at 524: The goal of school-based management is to end the "excessively centralized, bureaucratic control of urban schools."
'o See 1990 Ky Acts 476, § 92, which establishes the Office of Education Accountability
to ensure that the schools are operated free of political influence.
0 The new state board "will stop regulating and start providing technical assistance-including help designing curricula and assessing student performance-to local
school districts." Harrington-Lueker, 177 Am School Bd J at 18 (cited in note 59).
10 Id.
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ance depends on whether educational equity demands actual funding equality. Proponents of funding equality suggest that
arguments for any local funding of the schools are thinly-disguised
attempts to institutionalize the "assured, predatory self-interest"
of the privileged class." 0° Property tax-based school funding enables wealthy districts to have choices but deprives property-poor
districts of any real educational control."' The only way to remedy
the situation, according to those who demand equal revenues, is to
eliminate local funding altogether." 2
In the opposing camp, those who wish to retain districts' ability to supplement state funding with local tax revenues respond
that mandated funding equality is inefficient. Equal funding cannot take into account different levels of demand for education." s If
some districts are Willing to raise property taxes to fund their local
schools, the state would not improve overall education quality by
eliminating those districts' incentives to raise school spending. Judicially-mandated equality may actually cause more people to turn
to the private education market."' Therefore, the state should increase its funding to the poor districts without limiting the ability
of all districts to levy local taxes.
Ultimately, the decision of whether to implement a minimum
level or an equality-based school finance system may depend on
what a state regards as the proper role for education. If education
is seen primarily as a leveling device, perhaps a strictly equal funding system is better. Under this theory, those who are better educated benefit from a comparative advantage over others. A truly
equal funding system would attempt, to the extent possible, to
place all public school students on an equal footing. Of course, a
fully equal system must be funded sufficiently to prevent statewide
mediocrity." 5
130Kern Alexander, Equitable Financing, Local Control, and Self-Interest, in Julie
Underwood and Deborah Verstegen, eds, The Impacts of Litigation and Legislation on
Public School Finance 293, 305 (Harper & Row, 1990). Alexander continues: "A loss of local
control inevitably means a forced sharing of money with the inferior [classes]. . . . Because
of . . . the recognition that education is, in a real sense, power, the dominant classes have
held most strongly to their educational privilege by asserting local prerogative."
" Id. See also White's dissent in San Antonio School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 63
(1973).
I See Alexander, Equitable Financing,in Underwood & Verstegen, eds, The Impacts
of Litigation at 305.
McCarty & Brazer, 9 Econ of Educ Rev at 254 (cited in note 12).
13 Id. See also Thomas, 48 U Cin L Rev at 319 (cited in note 4).
15 McCarty & Brazer, 9 Econ of Educ Rev at 254.
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On the other hand, if more funding for education increases
overall productivity, then a minimum level funding system may be
better for the community as a whole. If the minimum level of state
funding is set high enough to assure everyone of a quality education, allowing supplemental local spending can only help districts
provide additional opportunities for their students. Moreover, the
effects of local discretionary funding on educational equality are
likely to be minimal, since local revenues would be a small percentage of aggregate school funds.
More importantly, a minimum level funding system, like that
of Kentucky, has the greatest potential to make use of the benefits
of local control. School districts are freer to experiment and respond to differences in community demand for education.116 Also,
the public schools are less likely to lose substantial numbers of students to the private sector. 1 7 Keeping people in the public sector
benefits the system as a whole, since people who have an interest
in the schools are more likely to vote for the necessary reform
packages.
CONCLUSION

Funding disparities among school districts can only be resolved through a greater state commitment to education. This
commitment necessarily involves both financial and substantive reforms in order to sustain local initiative within a framework of
state-monitored performance standards. While state constitutional
provisions increasingly will serve as a basis for reform, the particular wording of a state's education clause will not dictate which finance reform strategy that state ultimately must adopt. Hopefully,
as other states restructure their school systems, the approaches
taken by Kentucky and New Jersey will provide a useful example
of how such reforms might work.

'1

Id.
Thomas, 48 U Cin L Rev at 319.

